Online education, pro and con (but mostly pro)

A recent New York Times article describes a conflict over online courses that has erupted at San Jose State University. Members of the philosophy department there wrote an open letter to Harvard professor Michael Sandel objecting to using materials from his online social justice course in their own curriculum. Speaking as someone totally devoted to quality undergraduate education, I have several criticisms of the SJSU letter.

Where'd that paper go?

Over a year ago, I wrote a paper called "Curbing the Dangers of High-Frequency Trading" and submitted it to the Economists' Voice.  The final acceptance came through in March of 2012.  The official link is here, and an ungated copy is here.  Here is the problem: I didn't know where to find the published version, or even  that it had been published, until this week.

What's wrong with public debate, part 2

A previous post sparked another frustrating Facebook debate. Remarkably, the most active participant (other than me) continued to do many of the things that I had criticized in the post, even though these very criticisms initiated the debate, and even though I repeatedly pointed out that he was doing this. He never took issue with the items in the post itself; he just continued to provide examples of unreasonable, non-constructive debating tactics (inadvertently, I presume).

Regarding gun control specifically, these tactics do nothing to foster understanding between opponents, not to mention consensus of any kind. Still, to me, the more interesting and important issue is the nature of the debate itself. It may be understandable that people argue in nonsensical, counter-productive ways without realizing it, but it’s harder to understand, and to defend, when these things are at the forefront of the conversation. Limitations on cognitive ability or effort may provide part of the explanation, but not all of it. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is something other than pure reasoning going on: see, for example, Haidt's elephant and rider analogy, Kahneman's system 1 vs. system 2 thinking, Lakoff's metaphors and frameworks, or Kling's three axes model. I am nonetheless surprised to see the aggressive opposition to reason that I have encountered recently, and I wonder how typical it is.

Clearly we don't understand these psychological issues entirely, and if everyone could be aware of the things we do understand, we wouldn't have agreement on every issue that is currently contentious; but it would be clear where the disagreements really lie, and surely some areas of disagreement would be eliminated, if we were all on the same page about how the reasoning is actually happening. So should we strive toward greater enlightenment as a means of resolving (or reducing) conflict over public policy? I'm inclined to think that this is unrealistic. More likely we as a society will have to take these weirdnesses in mental processing as given and do the best we can in the face of them. For example, rules of evidence can be viewed as a means of managing jurors' potential irrationality, rather than trying to break through it (or pretend it isn't there). I have new respect for this approach. What to do in broader contexts, I have no idea. Yet.

Too much and not enough

I've been thinking about informational issues for several years. Part of the motivation for this arose during the vaccination scare, which was at a fever pitch around the time my son was born.

Luck and taxes

Consider what makes a movie a blockbuster. Many factors contribute to a film's success: quality of the writing, acting, directing, marketing, etc., as well as the public's response to these inputs. Not all of these are within the control of any one person, including the film's producer. If a film is unusually successful, chances are that it is due to a combination of factors, including some that are not predictable or controllable. One way to see this is to note that sequels to very successful films are, on average, more successful than typical films but less successful than their predecessors, because it is generally impossible to replicate everything that made the original film successful. (It's also possible that a sequel is produced just to milk the success of the original, without any intent of comparable quality, or that a sequel happens to be better than the original; thus the qualification of "on average" above.) This is a well-known statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean. Observations at the extreme of a distribution tend to get there for lots of reasons, including some randomness. Successive observations tend to be closer to the mean of the distribution. For another example, the sons of extremely tall fathers tend to be taller than average but shorter than their fathers, whereas the sons of very short fathers tend to be shorter than average but taller than their fathers.

Now consider income distribution. Someone with a very high income probably got there for a number of reasons, not all of which were under the individual's control: i.e., such a person probably worked hard, made good choices, etc., but also got lucky in some respects. Similarly, someone in the very low end of the income distribution probably got there partly as a result of individual action (or inaction) but partly as a result of happenstance. It's also possible that one man becomes rich even though external factors are against him, and another man becomes poor despite having every advantage in life; but on average, those in the extremes of the income distribution are there because of a variety of factors pointing in the same direction. This to me is the most compelling justification for progressive income taxes. Life is not fair, and the tax system (as well as some of the ways in which the revenue is spent) mitigates the inequities. The justification is even stronger when we consider that some advantages or disadvantages are systematic but still outside an individual's control. Note also that the tax system is not coming anywhere close to equalizing incomes, because there are still plenty of factors contributing to income that would generally be regarded as fair and should not be discouraged.

Of course there are other rationales, including the idea that those who earn higher incomes are benefiting more from our whole economic infrastructure, and therefore should contribute more toward its maintenance; and this one from Mark Thoma.

What's wrong with the gun-control debate (and public debate in general)

The debate over gun control frustrates me immensely, and this has nothing to do with whether or not anyone supports any specific law that I may or may not support.  It's all about how people defend their own opinion and criticize others' opinions.  This debate is a good illustration of problems that appear in public debate over lots of issues.  After the jump is a (probably non-exhaustive) list of tactics that aren't helping any.

The government is a camel

Over dinner with friends last week, I remarked that our government is a camel.  This was a reference to an old aphorism, "A camel is a horse designed by committee," nicely illustrated in this episode of Parks and Recreation:

The idea is that a compromise among many different opinions results in something that doesn't come anywhere near accomplishing the original goal.  I have often thought that the U.S. government would be immensely improved if it really embraced a single ideology, whether that ideology is liberal, conservative, libertarian, or whatever.  Even though I disagree with some libertarian (or liberal, or conservative) policies, I think that we would be much better off if we let the libertarians (or liberals, or conservatives) have their way across the board, rather than these groups working at cross-purposes most of the time.

I am also gaining more of an appreciation for how deep political differences really are.  It is much more than differences in values or priorities.  In The Political Mind, cognitive scientist George Lakoff describes the metaphors and narratives within which people frame political issues, and how these framing differences inhibit fruitful discussion, not to mention any kind of agreement.  I'm still reading the book, but it seems that Lakoff's aim is to improve the political process by creating greater awareness of our mental processes.  I'm not so sure that that's a realistic goal for the majority of the population (and I'm working on my own grand theory of how to achieve public consensus, but whether I'll get anywhere with that remains to be seen).

A more pointed objection I have to Lakoff is his insistence on the moral mission of government.  He says that health care, for example, is a moral necessity and as such should not be provided by for-profit entities.  Again, haven't finished the book yet, but I'm not sure how he is drawing the line between moral and non-moral issues, and more importantly, I don't know why he assumes that the government is a moral entity.  I'm always in favor of keeping morals out of the discussion as much as possible, especially when it's straightforward to consider welfare in a non-emotional, non-judgmental way.  Certainly the government can, at least some of the time, accomplish things that accord with at least some people's morals, but the real difference between government and firms is that the government is a mechanism for collective action.  Anarchists notwithstanding, we agree to give the government certain power over the citizenry, and if we're more or less in agreement about the aims to which that power should be put, the presence of the government makes everyone better off.  In any given situation, either government action or private action may be preferable because of the different incentives that exist in different kinds of organizations; but starting from the presumption that the government does what is moral is at best unnecessary and at worst very misleading.  The interesting thing here is that Lakoff seems to be subscribing to a narrative of government without being aware of it.  There's irony for you.

Lakoff's discussion of narratives and metaphors is largely consistent with Arnold Kling's three-axes model:

My hypothesis is that progressives, conservatives, and libertarians view politics along three different axes. For progressives, the main axis has oppressors at one end and the oppressed at the other. For conservatives, the main axis has civilization at one end and barbarism at the other. For libertarians, the main axis has coercion at one end and free choice at the other. So here is what I recommend doing when arguing with each:

When arguing with a progressive, start by saying, “It is sometimes appropriate to view particular classes of people as oppressors and other classes as oppressed.” Slavery is an example. Proceed then to suggest that, on the other hand, there are instances in which this way of looking at things is not so compelling. For example, if you think about it, borrowers who obtained homes with no money down are not necessarily oppressed, and the banks that lent them the money are not necessarily oppressors.

When arguing with a conservative, start by saying, “It is sometimes appropriate to view particular practices as barbaric and to view tradition and authority as protecting civilization.” There are, for example, criminals who commit assault and murder without remorse. Proceed then to suggest that, on the other hand, there are instances in which this way of looking at things is not so compelling. For example, if you think about it, Latin Americans who sneak across the border in order to work in this country are probably more civilized than barbaric.

When arguing with a libertarian, start by saying, “It is sometimes appropriate to view particular policies as coercion.” For example, taking tax revenue to hand out political favors. Proceed then to suggest, that, on the other hand, there are instances in which this way of looking at things is not so compelling. For example, if you think about it, it is plausible that some activities function better as monopolies: water and sewer service; courts; road systems. If competition is unworkable, then provision via elected government should not be considered coercive.

I think that this is a very useful model.  Recognizing the presence of all three axes doesn't necessarily lead to agreement, but it helps to put public debate on a reasonable footing.

Update: A few more thoughts on Lakoff, since I was still in the midst of reading when I wrote the post. He presents a very interesting and useful framework for thinking about political opinions and conflict, but there are some problems with his exposition (and possibly with his theory itself) that would make it easy for a reader not to take it seriously:

1. He talks about other models of human behavior and interaction as models, with the necessary disconnect from reality that that implies. He presents an alternative model--that people think within frameworks determined by narratives and metaphors--as if it is not a model, but a literal description of behavior. He spends a considerable amount of time discussing the dangers of taking any one model too seriously, not seeming to realize the potential problems of assuming his model is the right one, period.

2. He steps beyond the bounds of his own expertise. As an economist, I noticed this when he occasionally discussed an economic idea in an uninformed and unsophisticated manner. For example, he claims that insurance is fundamentally "anti-market," in a way that reminded me of what a fairly good undergraduate student might say in class without thinking something through. It's very straightforward to demolish the claim. This made me wonder whether he might be mangling ideas from other fields in ways not noticeable to me.

3. He presents his theory alongside advocacy for progressivism. Not that I would criticize progressivism or advocacy in general; nor would I deny that, in a sense, all research is advocacy research (that's a whole can of worms in itself); but Lakoff takes it to an extreme. He is basically saying that conservatives are doing all these things that are patently bad but are able to do them because they successfully manipulate the elements of his model, and that progressives must understand his theory in order to fight back. This can only limit the appeal of the theory.