In a previous post, I lamented the problems arising from the "well-intentioned propagation of misinformation." We would all be better off if everyone could just be less confident.
Information is often passed from one person to another without much filtering at all. Undergraduate students Bill and Ted converse about Bill's roommate, who is depressed and thus is arousing Bill's concern. Ted tells Bill there is a bright side: if the roommate commits suicide, Bill gets all As for the semester. Whatever this does to Bill's concern for his roommate, he is fairly likely to believe Ted's statement about university policy. It might not even occur to Bill to ask Ted, "How do you know that?" If he does ask, Bill probably will not require much in the way of authentication; something along the lines of "everybody knows" is likely to suffice. Bill might then repeat the supposed policy as if it were fact, not just something he heard. Casually received information becomes fact in the mind of the receiver through some combination of sounding reasonable in itself, appealing to the receiver's predispositions, and coming from a source the receiver trusts.
Bill would do better to state the literal fact he has experienced: "Ted told me that you'll get all As if..." rather than "You'll get all As if...." Another example: I read an article that said that the primary driver of the increase in the cost of higher education is the increase in the relative size of university administrations. This sounds reasonable to me, and at the very least is an interesting possibility to consider; but I'm not sure it's true. There could well be a dozen other articles that discredit or cast doubt upon the thesis of the first article. Without more than a single article to back me up, I would hardly be justified in stating, without qualification, that the primary driver of the increase in the cost of higher education is the increase in the relative size of university administrations. It would be especially irresponsible for me to say such a thing to my students. So, if I'm passing on something that I've heard or read, I specifically qualify it as such, and often mention the source. If I'm skeptical of the information, or if it is an issue for which jumping to an erroneous conclusion would be especially costly, I'll add that I don't know if it's true. This is a caveat for the listener or reader, but it doesn't hurt to remind myself.
Here are some phrases that I have come to use frequently when communicating information about which I am uncertain (in declining order of certainty):
Information is often passed from one person to another without much filtering at all. Undergraduate students Bill and Ted converse about Bill's roommate, who is depressed and thus is arousing Bill's concern. Ted tells Bill there is a bright side: if the roommate commits suicide, Bill gets all As for the semester. Whatever this does to Bill's concern for his roommate, he is fairly likely to believe Ted's statement about university policy. It might not even occur to Bill to ask Ted, "How do you know that?" If he does ask, Bill probably will not require much in the way of authentication; something along the lines of "everybody knows" is likely to suffice. Bill might then repeat the supposed policy as if it were fact, not just something he heard. Casually received information becomes fact in the mind of the receiver through some combination of sounding reasonable in itself, appealing to the receiver's predispositions, and coming from a source the receiver trusts.
Bill would do better to state the literal fact he has experienced: "Ted told me that you'll get all As if..." rather than "You'll get all As if...." Another example: I read an article that said that the primary driver of the increase in the cost of higher education is the increase in the relative size of university administrations. This sounds reasonable to me, and at the very least is an interesting possibility to consider; but I'm not sure it's true. There could well be a dozen other articles that discredit or cast doubt upon the thesis of the first article. Without more than a single article to back me up, I would hardly be justified in stating, without qualification, that the primary driver of the increase in the cost of higher education is the increase in the relative size of university administrations. It would be especially irresponsible for me to say such a thing to my students. So, if I'm passing on something that I've heard or read, I specifically qualify it as such, and often mention the source. If I'm skeptical of the information, or if it is an issue for which jumping to an erroneous conclusion would be especially costly, I'll add that I don't know if it's true. This is a caveat for the listener or reader, but it doesn't hurt to remind myself.
Here are some phrases that I have come to use frequently when communicating information about which I am uncertain (in declining order of certainty):
- My understanding is that...
- As far as I know, ...
- My impression is that...
- I'm inclined to think that...
- I suspect that...
- I wouldn't be surprised if...
Perhaps I sound terribly noncommittal, but amid a constant info glut I think you have to be. If I were a politician announcing a policy shift, I would put voters to sleep with a combination of GHW Bush's prudence and Mike Dukakis's reserve: something like "Our best information indicates that this is the best course of action."
The flip side of being too quick to accept information because it is appealing in one way or another is being too quick to dismiss information because it is unappealing. These are manifestations of the same phenomenon: coming to a conclusion with insufficient consideration or evidence. I wonder if the underlying problem is a lack of humility: having too much confidence not just in the information itself but also in one's own judgment, however cursory. Charitability is often lacking as well: not giving an opponent the benefit of the doubt, and trying to find excuses to reject a view rather than actually considering it. I think that charitability combined with humility can have a dramatic effect on discourse.
Of course, sometimes one side of an argument is simply wrong. If someone believes the earth is flat, I might be interested in understanding how he could possibly hold that view, but I daresay that no amount of humility or charitability on my part will allow him to win me over. I have often felt puzzled when I have observed the unwillingness of one side in a debate to listen to reason, and especially unwillingness to respond to arguments. Jones gives Smith a thoughtful, reasoned, civil argument against Smith's opinion, and Smith refuses to give in, even though he can't think of a counter-argument. Then I wonder if trust is the real barrier. Smith suspects Jones of sophistry and thus refuses to believe his argument, even though he can't identify any weaknesses. Progress can be made if the Smiths are willing to be charitable toward the Joneses, but if not, what are the Joneses to do?
The flip side of being too quick to accept information because it is appealing in one way or another is being too quick to dismiss information because it is unappealing. These are manifestations of the same phenomenon: coming to a conclusion with insufficient consideration or evidence. I wonder if the underlying problem is a lack of humility: having too much confidence not just in the information itself but also in one's own judgment, however cursory. Charitability is often lacking as well: not giving an opponent the benefit of the doubt, and trying to find excuses to reject a view rather than actually considering it. I think that charitability combined with humility can have a dramatic effect on discourse.
Of course, sometimes one side of an argument is simply wrong. If someone believes the earth is flat, I might be interested in understanding how he could possibly hold that view, but I daresay that no amount of humility or charitability on my part will allow him to win me over. I have often felt puzzled when I have observed the unwillingness of one side in a debate to listen to reason, and especially unwillingness to respond to arguments. Jones gives Smith a thoughtful, reasoned, civil argument against Smith's opinion, and Smith refuses to give in, even though he can't think of a counter-argument. Then I wonder if trust is the real barrier. Smith suspects Jones of sophistry and thus refuses to believe his argument, even though he can't identify any weaknesses. Progress can be made if the Smiths are willing to be charitable toward the Joneses, but if not, what are the Joneses to do?
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